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ALJs in State-Local Tax Cases:
To Whom Is Deference Due?
by Steve R. Johnson
This installment of the
column reports on an in-
teresting recent Nevada
sales tax case, State Dep’t
of Taxation v. Masco
Builder Cabinet Group.1
The case involved two is-
sues: (1) whether the De-
partment of Taxation
gave appropriate defer-
ence to the findings and
conclusions of the admin-
istrative law judge who
had originally heard the
case, and (2) whether the principle of equitable
tolling applied to extend the statute of limitations
period for the taxpayer’s refund claims. The tax-
payer, represented by attorney Brett Whipple, pre-
vailed in the Nevada Supreme Court on both issues.2
The first part below develops the facts of Masco.
The second part addresses the deference issue. The
third part considers the equitable tolling issue.
Facts of Masco
Masco is a nationwide cabinet manufacturing
company that sells its cabinets in retail showrooms.
It also installs cabinets in houses under construction
contracts.
For Nevada sales tax purposes, those two com-
mercial operations have different effects. Masco was
obligated to remit sales tax for each retail sale and
to remit use tax for each construction contract.3 The
sales tax and the use tax are calculated on the same
rate. However, sales tax is computed as a percentage
of the retail sales price of Masco’s cabinets, while
use tax is computed as a percentage of Masco’s cost
to acquire the components of the cabinets.4 Accord-
ingly, it is better, from a tax standpoint, for Masco to
enter into a construction contract than to make a
retail sale.
In 2003 Masco acquired Root Industries, a Ne-
vada company engaged largely in retail sales of
cabinets. Masco kept Root personnel and Root’s
computer system and accounting programs, which
had been designed for a retail sales operation. When
the accounting program generated invoices to send
to retail customers, it automatically added tax la-
beled as ‘‘sales tax.’’
However, under the construction contracts, Mas-
co’s customers agreed to pay Masco a lump sum in
exchange for Masco’s provision and installation of
the cabinets, and Masco agreed to be responsible for
paying any taxes. As a result, when former Root
personnel generated invoices for the lump-sum con-
tracts, they had to ‘‘back into’’ the contract price so
that the invoice total equaled the agreed-on lump
sum.
In 2006 the Nevada Department of Taxation
began an audit of Masco for periods from May 2003
to April 2006. During the audit, the above account-
ing procedures were discovered, and Masco and the
department’s auditor agreed that the Root operation
arguably had been paying sales tax on the construc-
tion contracts when it should have been paying use
tax instead. ‘‘The auditor and Masco agreed prelimi-
narily that Masco might be entitled to a refund for
the amount it arguably overpaid and that the audi-
tor would consider the issue of Masco’s potential
refund within the overall context of his audit.’’5
Three-year limitations periods exist in Nevada for
both a taxpayer making claim for refund of an
overpayment6 and the department assessing a defi-
ciency.7 Because it was expected that the audit
would be lengthy, the department asked Masco to
1265 P.3d 666 (Nev. 2011) (per curiam).
2The author consulted with Whipple on this case. All
information appearing in this column is drawn from the
reported decision and other public sources.
3Nev. Rev. Stat. 372.105 and 372.185; Nev. Admin. Code
372.200 (1).
4Id.
5265 P.3d at 668.
6Nev. Rev. Stat. 372.635(1) and 372.650.
7Nev. Rev. Stat. 360.355(1).
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execute a waiver of the assessment limitations pe-
riod. ‘‘Having agreed with the auditor that its refund
request would be dealt with in the context of the
audit,’’ Masco signed the waiver ‘‘with the under-
standing that the waiver would also maintain the
timelines of its own refund request. . . . Based upon
this understanding, Masco did not file a formal
refund claim.’’8
The audit was completed by August 2007. The
auditor left the department without telling Masco of
his departure and without informing Masco that the
audit had been completed. Masco tried to contact the
department, but its calls were not returned. In
October 2007, after the waiver had expired, Masco
was able to speak with the new auditor, who stated
that Masco’s refund request was being denied.
In December 2007 Masco received a deficiency
assessment from the department. Masco filed a
petition for redetermination of the deficiency and a
formal claim for refund. At the ensuing hearing
before an ALJ, the department argued that substan-
tively Masco had been acting as a retail seller (not as
a construction contractor) under the relevant con-
tracts and that procedurally the refund claim was
time barred in part.
The ALJ held for Masco on both issues. The ALJ
found that the contracts were construction, not
retail, contracts and thus that Masco had mistak-
enly overpaid sales tax. The ALJ also concluded that
Masco’s late filing of the formal refund claim was
excused because Masco had reasonably relied on the
first auditor’s assurance that Masco’s refund re-
quest would be considered within the overall context
of the audit.
The department appealed the ALJ’s determina-
tions to the State Tax Commission. The commission
reversed both of the ALJ’s determinations. The
district court reversed the commission and re-
instated the ALJ’s determinations. The Nevada Su-
preme Court affirmed.
Deference Issue
This column recently engaged in exploration of
when state courts afford deference to the decisions of
state and local tax administrators.9 In Masco, the
courts reviewed a decision by the State Tax Commis-
sion reversing a decision by the ALJ. Masco thus
raises the important question: To whom — to which
actor in the system of tax administration — do the
courts owe deference?
To whom — to which actor in the
system of tax administration — do
the courts owe deference?
Below I lay the groundwork for analyzing that
question by describing the use of ALJs at the federal
and state levels. Then, I turn to how Masco an-
swered the question.
Federal ALJs
Procedures used by federal agencies to adjudicate
cases are diverse. The federal Administrative Pro-
cedure Act (APA) prescribes procedures to be used in
so-called formal adjudications.10 Typically, those ad-
judications are conducted by ALJs. Federal ALJs are
appointed through a professional merit selection
process, may not be assigned duties inconsistent
with their judicial activities, and may be removed or
disciplined only for good cause.11
The ALJ conducts the hearing and, depending on
the dictates of the agency’s enabling act, renders
either an initial or a recommended decision. An
initial decision automatically becomes the decision
of the agency unless it is reviewed by a higher level
within the agency. A recommended decision must be
acted on by the higher level before it can come into
effect.
ALJs are crucial to the work of many federal
agencies, but not the IRS. The IRS has no substan-
tive adjudicatory power, so it does not use ALJs as
part of a process of determining tax liability.12
State ALJs
States, too, typically have APAs. The National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws developed a Model State Administrative Pro-
cedure Act (MSAPA) in 1946 and revised it in 1961,
1981, and 2010. Most state APAs are based in part or
8265 P.3d at 668.
9Steve R. Johnson, ‘‘Judicial Deference to State Tax Agen-
cies — An Overview,’’ State Tax Notes, Nov. 29, 2010, p. 633,
Doc 2010-24563, or 2010 STT 228-2; Johnson, ‘‘Chevron
Deference to State Tax Agencies,’’ State Tax Notes, Jan. 24,
2011, p. 285, Doc 2010-27202, or 2011 STT 15-2; Johnson,
‘‘Deference — Questions of Fact Versus Issues of Law,’’ State
Tax Notes, Mar. 21, 2011, p. 883, Doc 2011-3129, or 2011 STT
54-2; Johnson, ‘‘Conditional Deference to Tax Authorities,’’
State Tax Notes, Apr. 25, 2011, p. 269, Doc 2011-7239, or 2011
STT 79-5; Johnson, ‘‘Deference to Tax Agencies’ Interpreta-
tion of Their Regulations,’’ State Tax Notes, May 30, 2011, p.
665, Doc 2011-9625, or 2011 STT 104-4; Johnson, ‘‘New Light
on Auer/Seminole Rock Deference,’’ State Tax Notes, Aug. 15,
2011, p. 441, Doc 2011-15272, or 2011 STT 157-1.
10See 5 U.S.C. sections 554, 555, 556, and 557. Informal
adjudications are subject to lesser statutory safeguards (sec-
tion 555 only), but minimum standards of fairness and
procedural regularity are protected by the due process com-
ponent of the Fifth Amendment. Moreover, agency rules often
afford protections not mandated by statute.
115 U.S.C. sections 3105, 5372, and 7521.
12ALJs are used, however, to conduct hearings and render
decisions in cases in which the government seeks to discipline
practitioners before the IRS for violation of the professional-
ism requirements set out in Treasury Circular 230.
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in whole on either the 1961 version or the 1981
version of the MSAPA.13 A substantial literature
now exists on the use of ALJs under state APAs, both
generally14 and for particular states.15
The current (2010) version of the MSAPA contem-
plates that the presiding officer in an agency adju-
dication must be an ALJ (unless the agency head
presides, or designates another presiding officer)16
and that the ALJ will issue a recommended order or
an initial order.17
Unlike the IRS, state and local revenue authori-
ties often do have adjudicatory power, although it is
subject to judicial review. ALJs or cognate officials
often are used by state and local tax departments to
conduct initial examinations and render decisions.18
Spectrums of Deference
Masco exemplifies controversies in which an
ALJ’s decision is reviewed by a higher level of the
revenue authority, whose decision in turn is re-
viewed by the courts. The installments of this col-
umn cited in note 9 establish that there is a spec-
trum of judicial deference to the decisions of tax
administrators, ranging from de novo review (no
deference) to various shades of considerable defer-
ence.
But Masco-type cases implicate a second dimen-
sion. If deference is to be shown by the courts to tax
agency decisions, where does that deference attach
when the agency is divided (that is, when the
agency’s ALJ and the agency’s higher level have
reached conflicting conclusions)? In other words, to
what degree is the role of a deferential court to see to
it that the agency has shown due regard for the
ALJ’s decision?19
Regarding that question, too, a spectrum of views
exists. One polar position is that the ALJ who heard
the evidence is in the best position to decide the case,
thus that the courts should allow reversal by the
agency only when the ALJ’s decision is clearly
wrong. The other polar position would be that the
highest relevant authority in the agency is the one
who properly speaks for the agency, thus that the
courts should intervene to protect the ALJ’s contrary
resolution only in rare and clear cases.
Where one thinks the right answer lays along this
spectrum depends in part on the balance that exists
between fact-finding and lawmaking in agency ad-
judications. To the extent that the case is purely
factual, the ALJ’s superior exposure to the facts may
grow in importance.20 To the extent that policy
judgments and policy promulgation are implicated
in the adjudication, the superior political account-
ability of higher levels of the agency becomes
weightier.21
There is a trend — although it still
represents only a minority position
— in the direction of states giving
ALJs ‘de jure or de facto authority
to make the final agency decision.’
How do the various jurisdictions balance these
considerations? At the federal level, the APA pro-
vides that agency heads are not compelled to defer to
ALJs in the fashion that appellate courts typically
13See generally Jim Rossi, ‘‘Politics, Institutions, and Ad-
ministrative Procedure: What Exactly Do We Know from the
Empirical Study of State Level APAs, and What More Can We
Learn?’’ 58 Admin. L. Rev. 961 (2006).
14See, e.g., James F. Flanagan, ‘‘An Update on Develop-
ments in Central Panels and ALJ Final Order Authority,’’ 38
Ind. L. Rev. 401 (2005) (hereafter ‘‘Flanagan II’’); James F.
Flanagan, ‘‘Redefining the Role of the State Administrative
Law Judge: Central Panels and Their Impact on State ALJ
Authority and Standards of Agency Review,’’ 54 Admin. L.
Rev. 1355 (2002) (hereafter ‘‘Flanagan I’’); Jim Rossi, ‘‘Final,
but Often Fallible: Recognizing Problems with ALJ Finality,’’
56 Admin. L. Rev. 53 (2004).
15See, e.g., Ron Beal, ‘‘The Texas State Office of Adminis-
trative Hearings: Establishing Independent Adjudicators in
Contested Case Proceedings While Preserving the Power of
Institutional Decision-Making,’’ 25 J. Nat’l Ass’n Admin. L.
Judges 119 (2005); F. Scott Boyd, ‘‘Florida’s ALJs: Maintain-
ing a Different Balance,’’ 24 J. Nat’l Ass’n Admin. L. Judges
175 (2004); Jeff S. Masin, ‘‘New Jersey’s Office of Administra-
tive Law: The Importance of Initial Choices,’’ 23 J. Nat’l Ass’n
Admin. L. Judges 387 (2003); Frank Sullivan Jr., ‘‘Some
Questions to Consider Before Indiana Creates a Centralized
Office of Administrative Hearings,’’ 38 Ind. L. Rev. 389 (2005);
Ann Wise, ‘‘Louisiana’s Division of Administrative Law: An
Independent Administrative Hearings Tribunal,’’ 30 J. Nat’l
Ass’n Admin. L. Judiciary 95 (2010).
16MSAPA section 402(a).
17MSAPA section 413(b).
18See, e.g., State Dep’t of Revenue v. Boyd Bros. Transp.,
Inc., 56 50. 3d 701 (Ala. App. 2010); Felten Truck Line, Inc. v.
State Bd. of Tax Appeals, 327 P.2d 836, 839 (Kan. 1958); South
Carolina Dep’t of Revenue v. Blue Moon of Newberry, Inc.,
______ S.E.2d _______, 2012 WL 1111410 (S. Car. Apr. 4,
2012).
19‘‘The most difficult problem facing the reviewing court
arises when, as in this case, the [agency] and the administra-
tive law judge disagree on the facts.’’ Penasquitos Village, Inc.
v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1074, 1076 (9th Cir. 1977).
20See, e.g., Amco Elec. v. NLRB, 358 F.2d 370, 373 (9th Cir.
1966). (‘‘While [an agency] is not bound by the credibility
determinations of the trial examiner, nevertheless the proba-
tive weight which may be properly given to testimony is
severely reduced when an impartial experienced examiner
who has observed the witnesses and lived with the case has
drawn different conclusions.’’).
21See, e.g., Flanagan II, supra note 14, at 402 (expressing
the view that ‘‘ALJ finality has significant disadvantag-
es. . . . [I]t creates a loss of political accountability . . . and
also adversely affects the agency’s ability to develop and
implement a consistent regulatory scheme’’).
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do to trial courts’ findings of fact.22 Many states take
the same tack. However, there is a trend — although
it still represents only a minority position — in the
direction of states giving ALJs ‘‘de jure or de facto
authority to make the final agency decision, subject
only to judicial review.’’23
Deference in Masco
The Nevada Supreme Court’s decision to rein-
state the ALJ’s decision in favor of the taxpayer
rested on two planks: (1) the State Tax Commission
was obligated to uphold the ALJ’s determinations if
they were supported by substantial evidence, and (2)
the ALJ’s determinations were so supported.
Nevada statute provides that a ‘‘court shall not
substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to
the weight of evidence on a question of fact.’’ The
court may, however, set aside the agency’s decision if
it is based on an error of law or is ‘‘clearly erroneous
in view of the reliable, probative and substantial
evidence on the whole record.’’24
Moreover, Nevada statute directs that when an
ALJ’s decision is appealed to the State Tax Commis-
sion, that body must comply with the same standard
of review just quoted.25 Thus, the Masco court held:
‘‘if the ALJ’s findings were supported by substantial
evidence, the Tax Commission was prohibited from
substituting its own judgment for that of the ALJ.’’26
Although Nevada’s review scheme is not the norm
in its totality, it is the norm in its use of the
substantial evidence test. This is the most widely
used standard in formal adjudications at both the
state and federal levels.27
Substantial evidence is ‘‘that which a reasonable
mind would accept as adequate to support a conclu-
sion. [It] consists of more than a scintilla of evidence,
but less than a preponderance of the evidence.’’28
The substantial evidence determination is made
based on the whole record, considering both the
aspects of the record that support the agency’s
decision and the aspects that are contrary to it.29
Central to the Masco dispute was notation on the
Root-generated invoices of the line-item ‘‘sales tax.’’
The auditor and the commission saw that as proof
that Masco was acting as a retail seller. In contrast,
Masco argued that the line-item resulted from
Root’s computer-generated accounting oversight. At
the ALJ hearing, Masco presented oral and docu-
mentary evidence in support of its explanation. The
ALJ made detailed findings in Masco’s favor. Yet the
commission failed to address those detailed findings
and the evidence on which they were based.30
The Nevada Supreme Court found that Masco’s
documentary and oral evidence easily constituted
substantial evidence. The commission therefore
failed to accord proper deference to the ALJ’s deci-
sion.31
The Masco result might have been reached even
in a jurisdiction in which deference is owed to the
agency, not its ALJs. Even in those jurisdictions, the
agency’s decision will be reversed if not supported by
substantial evidence. The ALJ’s view gains weight
because the ALJ ‘‘sees the witness and hears them
testify, while the [agency] and the reviewing court
look only at cold records.’’32 The MSAPA accordingly
provides that the agency head reviewing an ALJ’s
order ‘‘shall consider the presiding officer’s opportu-
nity to observe the witnesses and to determine the
credibility of witnesses.’’33
Even when the agency reverses its ALJ’s decision,
that decision remains part of the record and is part
of the substantial evidence evaluation.34 Thus, an
agency’s ‘‘supporting evidence, in cases where it
rejects the examiner’s findings, must be stronger
than would be required in cases where the findings
are accepted.’’35
Equitable Tolling Issue
I examined the doctrine of equitable tolling in an
earlier installment of this column.36 Masco usefully
illustrates the doctrine in action.
In general, ‘‘equitable tolling is judge-made doc-
trine which operates independently of the literal
22‘‘On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the
agency has all the powers which it would have in making the
initial decision.’’ 5 U.S.C. section 557(b).
23Flanagan I, supra note 14, at 1359; see also Rossi, supra
note 14, at 55-64.
24Nev. Rev. Stat. 233B.135(3).
25Nev. Rev. Stat. 360.390(2).
26265 P.3d at 670.
27See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. section 706(2)(E); MSAPA section
508(a)(3)(D).
28Great Lakes Sales, Inc. v. State Tax Comm’n, 486 N.W.2d
367, 372 (Mich. App. 1992); see also NLRB v. Columbian
Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939); Con-
solidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
29See, e.g., Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474,
488-489 (1951); West Ottawa Ed. Ass’n v. West Ottawa Pub.
Schools Bd. of Ed., 126 Mich. App. 306, 313 (1983).
30265 P.3d at 670.
31Id. at 670-671.
32NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 369 U.S. 404, 408 (1962).
Although that is the conventional wisdom of American courts,
it is subject to debate. See, e.g., Max Minzer, ‘‘Detecting Lies
Using Demeanor, Bias and Context,’’ 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 2557
(2008) (noting that ‘‘the consensus in the legal and social
science literature is almost the opposite’’ but challenging that
consensus).
33MSAPA sections 414(e) and 415(b).
34Universal Camera, supra note 29, 340 U.S. at 493.
35Steve R. Johnson, ‘‘Equitable Tolling in State and Local
Tax Cases,’’ State Tax Notes, June 15, 2009, p. 917, Doc
2009-12539, or 2009 STT 113-2.
36Lantzy v. Centex Homes, 73 P.3d 517, 523 (Cal. 2003)
(internal punctuation omitted).
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